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**ARMY AFTER NEXT:
BUILDING DOWN TO A HOLLOW ARMY**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Army After Next: Building Down To A Hollow Army

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ABSTRACT

This study takes a look at the predominant influences on how armies have changed and reformed themselves in the past and assesses how they are influencing the U.S. Army today. It makes a prediction on whether or not the Army's system for controlling the nature and pace of change of the Army of the future, Army After Next, will successfully achieve the desired results. It uses history to identify the factors that control and inhibit change and contemporary writings to determine the effect of the Army's attempts to manage these factors in today's strategic environment. The study ends with a prediction of success for the Army After Next project, based on how well the Army has (or hasn't) controlled the predominant factors influencing change over the past decade.

"..... DURING ITS HISTORY this nation has entered upon six major wars without being prepared for one of them. WE DO NOT intend to face another crisis in this way. FOR THE FIRST time since the nation was formed, the people of the United States have decided that if we are called upon to fight, **our blood and treasure shall not be risked on battle fields for which no adequate preparations have been contemplated.** CIVILIANS AND MEMBERS of the nation's armed forces stand shoulder to shoulder to implement this decision of the people. WE MUST BE PREPARED AND WE SHALL BE PREPARED!"

MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES M. WESSON
Chief of Ordnance, U.S. Army
Army Arsenal Day, 10 June 1941¹

Introduction:

These words were taken from the cover of Irvin Berlin's 1941 song, "Arms for the Love of America." It was dedicated to Major General Wesson and subsequently became the song of the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps. If Major General Wesson's arithmetic is correct, then history has added a seventh occasion when this nation paid dearly with it's blood and treasure for it's lack of preparedness. Apparently, the U.S. Army received a mandate from the American people on the eve of World War II. Likewise apparent, time quickly dulled the memory of that mandate in the minds of both the Army and the American people. As the drums of war echoed and then faded following the last parade, so did America's resolve to always remain prepared. The result was a nation and an Army, totally ill-prepared for conflict on the Korean peninsula just five years following the Great War's end.

Today, the nation and the U.S. Army find themselves faced with an international security environment lacking a clear threat or even a peer competitor. Such a period has served as prelude to each of the seven times our nation has stumbled onto some past battlefield ill-prepared. With such a rich history as its backdrop, the Army is attempting to capitalize on this period, this opportunity, this "pause", to evolve itself doctrinally and materially into the land combat force needed to support the nation's future interests and defend it against its' future threats. The means by which the Army hopes to direct and guide this transformation is the Army After Next program. The intriguing question, in light of our past performance, is whether or not the Army will be successful in its efforts to transform itself. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to answer this particular question. To do this, I shall: identify the relevant influences on how Armies change; look at how the Army currently is dealing with these influences; offer some-type of prediction as to whether or not the Army will be successful in its efforts to transform; and given that the Army is successful, to offer a prediction as to what degree of success may be expected.

The act of modernizing an Army, either in part or in total, in itself, is not a guarantee that it will be prepared for war. The demands of future warfare are difficult to predict. The resolve to attain and maintain a force capable of succeeding

against the theoretical demands of a conceptual battlefield, against a hypothetical foe, is even more difficult to sustain. Determining which concepts or capabilities are worthy of the large capital investments required and therefore are deemed worthy enough upon which to risk "blood and treasure" dictates that a thorough and enlightened analysis of the means and mechanisms through which, "adequate preparations have been contemplated," be conducted. An analysis is necessary so that this nation does not again fail to field an Army capable of meeting the demands placed upon it by the nation or the challenges of future war on some future battlefield.

Army After Next:

It is surprising to many that the Army After Next is not an Army colloquialism for a specific unit, organization or force structure. It is, in simplistic terms, a process. The Army After Next process serves as a mechanism to meld the best guesses about the future: geopolitical environment, U.S. global interests, probable threats to U.S. interests, domestic political and economic trends, and technological advancements into the most plausible vision of future warfare. It is through this process that the Army's senior leadership intends to direct the pace, scope and nature of the changes they perceive are required

to meet the challenges to the nation's interests around the 2025 time-frame and beyond. The purpose of the Army After Next process, as described by the current Chief of Staff², is to conduct broad studies in warfare to frame issues vital to the development of the U.S. Army after about 2010.

The drafters of the Army After Next Fiscal Year (FY) 99 Study and Research Plan describe the project as a "uniquely ambitious and decidedly bold venture."³ Further in the introduction to the plan, the drafters express the desire that the project produces "revolutionary" changes in the capabilities of the future force. They state:

"Historically- for organizations not in crisis- near-term change tends to focus on organizational evolutions, equipment modernization, and the applique or integration of new technologies. Conversely, historical planning for more distant futures gravitates towards bolder possibilities and a wider range of possibilities. This is especially true for the profession of arms where the inherently and necessarily cautious nature of the profession compels near-term planners to prudently evolve the proven extant force, while longer-ranged 'futurists' have a much greater freedom to deal in possibilities and emerging capabilities in a more revolutionary fashion."

This excerpt provides an insight into a means by which success may later be defined. The particular expectation of the project expressed here is captured in one of the Army's often used buzz-phrases -"a revolution in military affairs." This refers to the scope and extent to which change in Army methods and capabilities are desired.

The Army After Next project or process is seen as an

"empirical" exploration of ideas harvested from other Services, academic institutions, and civilian industry about the future. The process is intended to be a systematic inquiry using state-of-the-art war-gaming exercises with the expectation of producing a comprehensive, analytical, holistic, systematic means of conducting inquiries into the possibilities and potentialities of future Army forces. The Army After Next process is designed to be a continuous, institutionalized method for looking forward 25 to 30 years into the future to guide the development of new concepts of operations, new capabilities based on emerging technologies, and new ways of employing both. New equipment is conceptualized, virtual organizations are developed to utilize the materiel, new operational concepts are developed to employ both effectively and all three are tested, in simulation, against an intelligent, aggressive and capable foe. The most promising ideas are fed into the Training and Doctrine Commands' Combat Development process for procurement, acquisition, testing and further refinement. It is what happens to the concepts as they pass through the military system of systems intended to produce a trained, ready and prepared force, that is the subject of this study.

Factors Effecting Change:

"... They're in the camps and in the training schools, Now give them the tools, They've got to have tools..."⁴

In her analysis of why France failed to adequately prepare for war against Germany during the inter-war period between World Wars I and II, Eugenia Kiesling identified three "discrete elements" that have driven the direction in which Armies have changed in the past. She noted that national security policy, military organization and military doctrine guide the process of change.⁵ She further noted that national security policies and military doctrine jointly influence military organizations and these were derived from a multitude of inputs. In her words,

"national security policies and military doctrines alike derive not from theoretical judgements, but from a confusion of conflicting inputs-political, economic, cultural, technological, psychological and institutional-"⁶

Through the course of her book, Kiesling asserts that the French lacked a politically acceptable national security strategy and that without this, she was unable to muster the political will to link her diplomatic schemes to her industrial, health, labor and foreign policies. Lacking the synchronizing effect of a coherent national security strategy, the economic and political support for any military strategy other than the one she implemented was nonexistent. Strategies, policies and military organizations, according to her, are the result of the political application of national wealth and treasure against a politically acceptable requirement. These can be swayed, changed or nullified by the

influences of culture (both that of the society at large and that of the military as an institution). Kiesling posits that the reason the French Army was ill-prepared to face the Germans at the beginning of WWII was because it was unwilling to expend the resources required, both financial and human, to develop and field an Army capable of meeting the threat that German military power represented. Unwilling to face the demands that war with Germany would dictate, French civilian and military leaders developed military strategies, organizations and doctrine which matched the resources that they were willing to expend. They then, through a process of mental gymnastics she called "cognitive dissonance"⁷ convinced themselves that what they did develop was more than sufficient to deal with the German military threat. She quotes a warning given by a French politician of the times that France needed to have "either the army of her policy or the policy of her army."⁸ That France had neither, Kiesling concludes, is the primary reason for the devastating defeat she suffered at the hands of Germany and why her defeat was preordained.

National security strategy incoherence and fiscal insufficiency were not the only factors that Kiesling credits for France's military shortcomings. The interplay between that which was required and that which was provided took place in front of a cultural backdrop set ablaze with the vibrant clashes of a civil-

military friction that prevented senior military leaders and French politicians from having serious dialogue about the military's ability to meet the demands of French national security. Add to this an inflexible French military culture, supported by rigidly control military institutions, which allowed senior military leaders to accept the constraints imposed upon them thus facilitating the self-deception, and the stage was set for one of the greatest defeats in history.

Harold Winton, looking at the development of armored doctrine in the British Army during the period 1927 to 1938, outlined factors that influence how militaries change that were similar to those described by Kiesling. In general, he describes the process as, "...extremely complex and highly interactive with the internal structure of the military institution and the external environment in which it takes place."⁹ His view of how reform occurs focuses primarily on the internal dynamics of the military institution, but acknowledges that politics creates the environment in which change must occur. The amount the political elect are willing to expend for the national defense, in the name of the people, forms the medium in which technology, doctrine and organizations must interact, reform and change. In the case of the British Army, Winton establishes in his prologue that the political environment in which change had to occur set both the pace and extent of that change and thereby established its

limits. Winton writes:

"The British Conservative position on the army (and defense problems in general) was that military and financial security depended on one another, i.e., that the minimum requirements should be met with the lowest possible expenditure".¹⁰

He goes on to indicate that while there were differences between the British Conservative and Labor parties on just what constituted "minimum requirements," there was a general consensus that the overall amount expended on defense should be low.¹¹

An additional aspect of the political environment Winton addresses, in a similar fashion to that of Keisling, was that of the national strategy. In Britain's case, the dominant attitude in parliament toward national defense focused narrowly on the security of the empire and the homeland. The necessity to deal with the possibility that diplomatic agreements would once again cause her to expend "blood and treasure" in a war on the European continent was annually postponed. Parliament's annual pronouncement that no foreseeable major conflict would occur on the continent for at least 10 years lasted right up until Germany invaded Poland in 1939.¹² The demands of homeland defense and defense of the empire dictated military capabilities vastly different from those required by the topography of the continent or the emerging mobility and lethality of the German army. Just as in France, there were a few British political voices that acknowledged the importance of balancing strategy with military capability. Viscount Richard Haldane, during the time that he

was the Lord Chancellor counseled the British government that, "There is only one method to adopt, and that is to go very quietly, to cut our coat according to the cloth we have to make it with."¹³

Also just as in France, attempts at reformation by the British army took place in front of a political, economic and strategic backdrop that did not facilitate the efforts of the brave few visionaries who appeared on the scene. In his epilogue, Winton summarizes the lessons that can be derived from the British attempts at reformation during the inter-war period and applied to the future. He placed a large responsibility for the direction and extent to which an army can change on senior military leaders. He held that they have a continuous requirement to articulate a vision of the nature of future war. This vision, he says, must be communicated both to their political masters, as well as to their subordinates. Winton stresses that this vision must be "informed by strategic requirements, emerging technologies, the nature of one's likely adversaries, and one's own historical and cultural operational styles."¹⁴ His summary observations allude to his earlier discussion of the inhibiting impact of military culture and dominant, but narrow minded, personalities when he indicates that the senior leader vision of future war requires intellectual mastery of the nature of war in many different forms, the product of which should be sound ideas

or doctrine. He stipulates that doctrine requires actual field testing both for its own validation and refinement and for specific decisions concerning how it is to be implemented in terms of organization, weapons and equipment, methods of training.¹⁵ Additionally, Winton believes that senior military leaders have a continuing obligation to discuss with the political elect the institutional implications of their policies and the capabilities and limitations of existing and proposed organizational forms and doctrines.¹⁶ He observes that these areas are often neglected in political-military consultations that tend to focus strictly on the resource implications of policy and strategy. Likewise he concludes that politicians must maintain a continuous dialogue with military leaders to keep them intimately informed of what the political requirements are and are likely to become, if, he says, politicians want an instrument that is capable of executing their will.¹⁷

As mentioned before, Winton focuses most of his attention on the internal dynamics of the army as a military institution and the debilitating effects of both the conservative army culture, and the opposition to change, often tied to parochial branch interests, of influential senior leaders. Although he offers several examples of both, the collective decision-making characteristics of the British Army Council typify the nullifying nature of the conservative army culture and General Montgomery-

Massingberd's actions to preserve the British Cavalry at the expense of armor development in the British army represents the influential senior leader.¹⁸

Williamson Murray, in his summary essay for "Military Innovation in the Interwar Period", "Innovation Past and Future", highlights national assessments, political guidance and military leadership as the necessary and essential elements for innovation and change in an army. He states that national assessments are "a crucial influence" in determining whether military organizations innovate successfully.¹⁹ He believes that broad innovations, either undertaken or neglected by military institutions, often depend on "the political guidance and strategic framework" in which institutions operate. He believes this especially holds true in western democracies.²⁰ Murry's last major point of the essay is that military leadership has the greatest influence on innovation. Senior military leaders influence innovation, either evolutionary or revolutionary, through "long-term cultural changes, rather than immediate short-term decisions".²¹

Students of the use of the military element of power in nation-states from Clausewitz to Jablonsky have attested to the controlling nature of national strategy and politics on the purpose for, and the operation of, the military. Authors who have addressed the broad questions of what causes armies to

change in the manner in which they do and what directs the choices they make seem to consistently address the same factors. A small measure of information synthesis is required at this point in order to build a conceptual bridge to the analysis that follows in the next section. The list of common factors that can be garnered from the literature includes: national security strategy; politics and democratic government processes; the domestic budgeting process; the military institutional structure and specifically for this study, the army structure; military/army culture; technological advances; and doctrine.

In the case of how an Army changes, the work of the authors reviewed indicates that the more clearly the elected political representatives can articulate the nature and intensity of the nation's interests, then the more clearly the degree to which the nation-state will go to protect those interests can be determined. The national security strategy serves as a very broad framework within which, the complex interplay between the political elect; the attitudes, perceptions and culture of the governed; and the financial resources of the nation-state occurs. The result of this complicated interaction is to produce the priorities for, and means that will be allocated, to the military element of national power. During times when there has been no apparent threat to national security, the attention and

priorities of governing bodies have shifted to domestic concerns.

This has generally manifested itself in the form of reduced military spending. The interactions between senior military leaders and the civilian authorities responsible for their administration, supervision and utilization, creates its own influence on military operations and military change. To the extent that this communications connection is established and provides an open and clear two-way honest exchange of ideas and information, then the less likely it is that there will be a disconnect between national strategic objectives and the military capabilities required to obtain them. The converse of this is equally as true. If this connection is dysfunctional, or if articulation of needs and capabilities is clouded, then the greater the likelihood of a mismatch between security requirements and military capabilities. Within the military, the existing institution and culture directly influence the nature of change through the establishment of priorities, the further allocation of resources, and its perceptions of the limits, capabilities and applications of emerging technologies. Service parochialism, branch parochialism within the Army, and influential collective decision making bodies, which tend to produce collegial decisions acceptable to each party, all exert powerful influences on the nature of change. Within the institutional and cultural atmosphere just described, the process

by which changes in technology, doctrine and force structure are developed and tested creates its influences on the manner and direction of change.

Under the most liberal of standards, canvassing the observations and conclusions of three authors can hardly be construed as a thorough review of the available literature. The limits of this study preclude a more detailed literary review. Other works in this area, if included, might produce variations in the degree to which each factor influences the process, but few additions to the list of most commonly identified influences would be made.

Current State of Affairs

".... They speak in a foreign land, With weapons in ev'ry hand, What ever they try we've got to reply in language that they understand..."²²

In his essay discussing the economic foundations of military power, Edward Earle makes an observation that can be found in some form or another in almost every piece on war, politics and the military institution when he writes,

" But whatever the political and economic philosophies that motivate a nation, it can ignore only at dire peril the requirements of military power and national security, which are fundamental to all other problems of government."²³

That the United States has repeatedly not paid attention to the

requirements of military power and national security is evidenced by MG Wesson's observations quoted as an introduction to this treatise. David Jablonsky attempts to provide an explanation for why developing a clear, coherent national security strategy with broad acceptance is so difficult in his piece, "Why is Strategy Difficult?". DR. Jablonsky concludes that a truly comprehensive American national security strategy is not likely to emerge in peacetime.²⁴ The case that he builds prior to drawing this conclusion is based on the intentional division of power between the executive and legislative branches under the constitution and the increasing tendency in the congress since Vietnam to disperse power for policy actions among numerous committees and sub-committees. The congressionally mandated National Security Strategy, annually published by the President, represents the Administration's view of national interests, their importance and the threats against them. Because the President's views are not debated, and according to DR. Jablonsky there isn't a centralized forum for such a debate to occur, no broad base consensus exists. If there is no mechanism which will produce consensus on the President's annual strategy, there is certainly no means to develop a board base of support for a long-term strategy looking thirty years into the future. In times of peace, the historical pattern of U.S. governments has been to focus on domestic concerns that generally have been subordinated

to the dictates of national security during times of increase tension or war. This has almost always manifested itself in the form of a political environment which has demanded an increase in domestic spending to redress suspended domestic issues. It is that this environment brings with it a tendency to treat anything associated with defense with antipathy that our history, and that of many democracies, reveals a parallel pattern of low military readiness, low military modernization and low defense spending. The United States has been in such a period of peace since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989.

The budgeting process, which is a primary means through which senior military leaders interface with Congress, is the principle mechanism through which Congress conveys its decisions about national priorities. Senior military leaders are the conduit to the legislative and executive bodies, the protectors of service culture and the keepers of the institutional status quo. It is impossible to dissect the dynamics of this relationship into its component parts. How much of what is budgeted for the military is a result of how senior leaders express themselves before Congress? How much of how the military departments express their financial requirements is based on the desire of each service to obtain as much of the resources allotted for defense as possible, regardless of the actual demands made of their service by the national security strategy? How many of the priorities expressed

in each of the service's budget reflect the interests of the dominant branch within the service without respect to the requirements within the service based on the national security strategy. The ramifications of the interplay between Congress, the military institution and service culture directly influences the composition of the military force, its readiness to meet current requirements, and how the force prepares for the future. Don Snider, in an essay on civil-military relations, notes the following:

"... neither the civilian leadership, regardless of party, nor the military services have a common vision of the future. They have no clear concept of what the military should be able to do, and therefore no common vision of how the services should be organized, trained and equipped for the 21st century."²⁵

So if Winton is correct, and the primary responsibility falls on senior military leaders to convey to the political elect their view of the military capabilities and limitations needed to meet present national security requirements, the form and clarity of that communications is of the upmost importance. Using Snider again as a reference, he observed in his study on the dominant influences in post-cold war executive decision making, that it was the requirement to produce a reduction in defense spending and the desire to control the nature and extent of force reductions that drove the Powell, Cheney and Bush team to generate a 25 percent reduction in conventional forces in 1990.²⁶ The debt that ensued with Congress following the release of the

Administration's plan at least had as its base a common acceptance of the nation security strategy. The point of contention became the composition of the force. Senator Sam Nunn developed alternative options for meeting national security requirements with conventional forces different from those purposed by the Administration.²⁷ An observation made by Snider about the debate that followed can be applied to budget discussion every year there after. He said, " defense was little debated on its own merits, but was a pawn in the larger partisan battle over the Federal Budget and priorities for deficit reductions."²⁸

The form and nature of the military's communication with Congress, and Congress's confidence in that communication, shapes the defense budget. Senator John McCain's introduction to the 1994 report on the hollowness of the military at that time goes a long way to describe the growing skepticism that legislators had about the quality of the information they were receiving from senior military leaders. He stated:

".... Today, that readiness is beginning to evaporate. In spite of the efforts of our services, we are going hollow. We are losing the combat readiness and edge that is an essential aspects of deterrence, defense, and the ability to repel aggression..... The fact is, however, that we **are** going hollow. We are losing our ability to get there "firtest with the mostest", and the indicators are all too clear the moment we look beyond superficial indicators and the normal rhetoric of budget testimony."²⁹

In October 1996, Senator McCain was quoted as saying: "

Gentlemen, the credibility gap between you and Congress is as wide as the Grand Canyon.”³⁰ His words were in response to then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shalilashvili’s apparent reversal of his previously adamant position on when soldiers would be withdrawn from Bosnia. The reception the Joint Chiefs received in September 1998 following an unexpected visit of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the House Arms Services Committee where they asked for an additional \$125 billion dollars over the next five year period (five months after the normal budgetary testimony), Senator Robert Smith angrily said:

“Again and again, we hear from people under your chain telling us thing about problems, and they get glossed over in the statements [coming out of the Pentagon]. We’re not getting direct answers until today.”³¹

Congress seriously doubts the credibility of senior military leaders. Their effectiveness as the conveyers of the “vision” and the “translators of capabilities and requirements” is doubtful.

Senator McCain’s 1994 introduction to his report makes a second very powerful statement about Congress’s suspicion that military leaders, in concert with the President, have allowed the force to become hollow. Although senior military leaders staunchly contend that the force is not hollow³², the evidence that the system of systems which provisions the force has in fact generated a hollow force is clearly present. Interpretation of

the evidence is a function of prospective. The indicators commonly used in discussions of hollowness are readiness, funding, compensations, and operational tempo. The prospective taken by most senior leaders on the issue of "hollowness" is to compare present day conditions to those of the post-Vietnam 1970s. James Kitfield, author of the article, "The Hollow Force Myth" indicates: that the readiness problems are the result of an intentional shift in spending priorities based on the fiscal realities presented to the military over the past ten years; the notion that defense is underfunded is not correct when current spending is viewed in its historical prospective; that the discussion on compensation lacks merit when housing, subsistence and medical benefits are included in the calculation; and finally, that the notion that the current operational tempo is the result of too many misguided missions is specious given that both political parties have supported the use of the military in most, if not all, of the small scale operations over the last decade.³³

Anyone who looks at the present condition of the military, and specifically the condition of the Army; however, would agree with Mr. Kitfield that it is the direct result of the decisions and the priorities established by senior military leaders over the past ten years. Military forces were downsized roughly 30 percent from 1990 to 1996. The Army's reduction was the largest

of all the services and constitute over 30 percent of its entire force structure. Of the 40 percent reduction in defense spending over the same period of time the Army's portion of the defense budget dropped from 30 percent to 23 percent.³⁴ Was it service parochialism or necessity that drove the Army's share of the defense reductions to be larger than any of the other services? Interestingly enough, the Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff both the authority and the responsibility to ensure that all of the service budgets support the national security and national military strategies. The Chairman's Program Guidance and the Chairman's Program Assessment are tools that are available to influence and adjust service programs. M. Thomas Davis supports the contention that it is unrealistic to expect the Joint Chiefs to make hard trade off decisions between services, when they themselves are the originators of service programs and budgets.³⁵ Neither these tools, nor the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee, appear to have been used to maintain a balance between national strategy and service resource allocations.

Conceding Kitfield's observation on readiness, within the Army, the 1996-1997 decision to shift the priority of spending from readiness to procurement and acquisition has contributed greatly to its current condition.³⁶ Reduced Army budgets have caused Army senior leaders to consistently have to make trade off

decisions between current and future readiness. From 1990 until roughly 1996, the Army's leadership placed the priority on current readiness. Procurement and acquisition dollars were used to pay the growing Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) bills. Within the last couple of years the priority has shifted to future readiness. OMA dollars, which pay for installation base operations, spare parts and training exercises, have been used to fund the research and development of future weapon systems. Given the expectation of savings from the reduction of infrastructure, funding for procurement programs based on these anticipated saving was lost either because funds were retained at higher levels and not passed on to the Army or Congress found further reductions in Army installations unpalatable. Regardless of the cause, Army leaders desperate to generate funds for new programs made decisions such as the sub-optimization of the personnel account in 1996 and 1997 by 15,000 soldiers and used the cost-avoidance savings to fund procurement.³⁷ In a force unable to meet the Congressional mandated end-strength and attempting to function with almost 40 percent of its personnel un-available for daily operating requirements, this decision added significantly to the operating tempo that some credit for the low retention and low recruiting problem. The affect of the reduction in OMA dollars is becoming apparent in the readiness indicators of the units designated as early deploying in support

of either or both of the contingency plans focused on the two theaters were the potential for major wars exists. The February 1999 testimony of Colonel John Rosenberger, Opposing Forces Commander at the National Training Center, before Congress indicated that the combat readiness of the 12 brigades he has observed show a "substantial decline". He based his conclusions on his observations of the 12 commanders and their staffs operating in over 100 force-on-force battles and live fire exercises between 1992 and February 1998. He concludes that the cause of the decline he has observed is that units are suffering from "..... an inability to train at every level with the battle-focus and frequency necessary to develop and sustain its full combat potential".³⁸ Given the decline in training proficiency of combat units rotating through the National Training Center, the reader should wonder about the many early deploying and follow-on combat support and combat service support units that are of a lower readiness priority. The Army has developed a tiered readiness policy which allows it to distribute the insufficient resources it does receive to the units, predominately combat units, senior leaders perceive are the most important. Readiness reviews generally focus on the units that are in the highest category to receive resources, Tier I. Some of the Tier I units, in addition to being apportioned a higher percentage of the available budget, are directed to receive a

higher percentage of personnel fill. Some units are maintained at 105 or 110 percent. Since the number of soldiers available annually is a finite number, when any unit has a percent of fill higher than 100, then some unit in a lower Tier authorized a soldier of the same military occupational skill and grade will never receive the soldier. As long as the Army evaluates its readiness by reviewing the status of Tier I units, then the hollowness caused by the priority decisions made by senior leaders are obscured. Looking at readiness by Tier is a horizontal assessment. Unfortunately, combat units are never deployed into combat alone. For every Tier I Division deployed, there are lower Tiered Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units that must be deployed to provide the total capability required to sustain combat operations. Also unfortunate is the reality that today's national security strategy in operation places less of a demand on combat units and a greater demand on the CS and CSS units in the lower Tiers. This reality, in conjunction with those produced by decisions made in The Total Army Analysis process, shift the point of greatest stress on the readiness system to the units with the less amount of redundancy and flexibility. A vertical review of readiness might bring the readiness problems of these lower Tiered organizations to the fore-front and present a totally different picture of combat readiness to senior leaders and to

Congress. That readiness is viewed horizontally instead of vertically is a function of choice. That "hollowness", as envisioned in the minds of senior leaders, is only viewed in relation to the hollow force of the post Vietnam era is a function of prospective and culture. To expect that the decision makers would concede that their best judgements have produced a force incapable of meeting the demands placed upon it by the current security strategy is extraordinarily unrealistic. It was not the leaders of the Vietnam era Army that proclaimed the Army of the late 1970's as hollow. This pronouncement was made by the Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels of the Vietnam era Army, after they had risen to ranks high enough to control the process of rebuilding the Army. So it shall be in the present case. There is not clear definition of "Hollow Army." Although not an official Army publication, the widely used, "How the Army Runs" provides the only definition in print. It states, from a personnel prospective only, that the Army is hollow when there are more "spaces" or personnel authorizations than there are "faces" or people to fill them.³⁹ If the standard for defining whether or not the force is hollow is to be a comparative one, then ought it not be current status against the status necessary for optimum combat effectiveness. Optimum training proficiency against current proficiency, current morale against optimum morale, current modernization against optimum modernization or

current readiness against optimum readiness.

The current state of hollowness in the Army is even bleaker if the status of the Industrial Base (commercial businesses and the Army Depot System, which provide the materiel required to support the Army in peace and war) is taken into consideration. "Arms for The Love of Army," was written because of the great demand for the industrial base to surge its capacity before the U.S. could enter W.W.II. The draw down has reduced the number of businesses manufacturing the "tools" of war to a bare minimum. The Army trend to out-source the sustainment of key weapon systems, like the Apache, to a commercial vendor in order to gain greater peacetime efficiencies is dubious at best. Items produced by the smaller industrial base and those provided by prime vendors will be subject to the pressures of the peacetime economy. By design, the number of spares to support operations will be maintained at peacetime demand levels. Tooling, craftsmen and machinery will be maintained in quantities geared to support peacetime demands. The capacity of either the industrial base or the prime vendor to surge to meet unexpected demands will be very limited. The U.S. Army will be forced to either engage in combat operations of very limited duration or delay entry in to combat until the capacity to wage sustained combat can be rebuilt. One need only refer to Fehrenbach's description of the Army at large, and Task Force Smith in particular, to understand the full extent

of such a state of affairs⁴⁰. Today's Army is in fact, "HOLLOW".

Prediction for Army After Next

The focus of the Army After Next project is solely on the dynamics which occur between technology, doctrine and future force structure. Revolutionary change, as outlined in the AAN Study and Research Plan may be possible if one uses the definition of revolutionary change in warfare outlined in a 1993 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The study indicated that a "holistic effect provided by the integrating framework of doctrine and organization coupled with the enabling executing capabilities provided by technology" would produce a revolution in warfare.⁴¹ Were it possible to isolate the process of how the Army changes from the external factors which influence it, then the likelihood of the Army After Next project achieving its desired end-state would be greater. There is no reason to believe that the influences of change that have been active throughout history will not produce results with the Army After Next similar to those they have produced in armies in the past. One need only remember the stifling effect army culture has had on revolutionary technological advances such as the airplane, the tank and the helicopter. Parochial branch interests, and the inability to imagine the possible, both served

to limit the Army's ability to recognize the potential utility of each of these systems until years after they were first introduced. Jablonsky, quoting the Tofflers in his study, "The Owl of Minerva Flies at Twilight," makes it clear that military revolutions occur only when "an entire society transforms itself, forcing its armed services to change at every level simultaneously—from technology and culture to organization, strategy, tactics, training, doctrine and logistics...."⁴² Harold Winton's closing words seem to provide the perfect prediction for what will happen as the Army After Next concepts transition to more tangible artifacts of innovation and change.

He wrote:

" So long as ideas per se are all that are at issue, relatively little objection is encountered in the reform process. Changes in organization, equipment, and training, however, carry with them specific and frequently adverse consequences for various groups not to lose influence and a genuine conviction that these groups make a significant contribution to victory in combat act to impede change. Overcoming this resistance requires three things: support at the top of the organization, a mechanism for building consensus that change is necessary, and the habit of rational analysis of tactical and operational ideas mentioned above. Of all the requirements, the last seems to be the most significant and also the hardest to produce."⁴³

Interestingly enough, not even the concept of "rational analysis" escapes the influences of Army culture. The "Can Do" attitude and "Never Fail" spirit that senior leaders are accused of by Congress is ever present in the mid-level leaders who actually design and conduct the simulations and exercises which constitute Army experimentation. During the 1999 Army After Next Spring War Game, General(Retired) Maddox reminded his Senior Mentor Team that " An experiment that consists of one trial can hardly be called an experiment." In the 1998 Army Warfighting Experiment that validated the structure and concepts associated with the digitized division, there was little chance that such a major investment would be allowed to fail. When the concepts produced through the Army After Next process reach the point that they are procured, fielded in limited quantities to a test unit, and subsequently undergo warfighting experimentation, unless the army culture has been significantly altered, the results will be equally as preordained.

Murray in the closing words to his essay on innovation states the following:

" Innovation in the next century demands extensive cultural changes in how the services do business and even in the moral parameters within which they view the world. Some recent U.S. military leaders have recognized the need for major changes in the cultural frameworks, but unfortunately such general officers remain in the minority. Until, however, there is a wider recognition of the difficulties involved in innovation, the services will not see significant change."

At some point, Army After Next concepts must meet the realities of the budgeting process. The Battle Force concept of AAN, essential to the notion of Strategic Preclusion, demands a significant increase in Air Force cargo carriers, both to move it and sustain it once it's in place. Unless the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee, or the Chairman himself, intercedes the Air Force is not likely to voluntarily defer its planned acquisitions and consume large portions of its resources to obtain the type and quantity of aircraft that will be required to support the Army's needs. There is no reason to believe that the Army will not continue to suffer from under-funding. That this is recognized to a limited degree has caused the Army leadership to introduce the concept of a "Hybrid Force" in to AAN thinking. The Hybrid Force will have a mixture of enhanced Army XXI systems and some Army After Next(AAN) Systems. Under-funding should continue to cause Army leaders in the future to make trade-offs between alternatives as bad as those facing leaders today. The consequences of those decisions will tend to mitigate against AAN concepts and doctrine reaching there full potential. The civil-military gulf that has caused Congress to question the credibility of today's senior leaders is more likely to worsen instead of get better. Fewer and fewer politicians in the future will have military experience. Their staffs are likely to be equally as void of military experience. Today's successful

senior leaders will continue to select officers for promotion in their own image. The result will be senior leaders no more capable of communicating military requirements and capabilities associated with the national security strategy effectively than those of today. The architects of change, following the patterns of their predecessors, are focusing on those influences that are within the Army's control. The success of changing the Army is dependent less on how well the Army controls those factors which are internal to it, but in how decisively the Army engages the external factors. It will be the changes that must occur in the interaction between the Army and the Joint community, and the Army and Congress that will dictate the degree to which success is attained.

Unless, as Murray suggests, there is a significant change in the military culture, the ebb and flow of national security strategy, politics, budgets and service culture should turn the possibilities of today's AAN into tomorrow's hollow force.

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END NOTES

1. Irving Berlin, "Arms for the Love of America" (New York: Irving Berlin Inc., 1941), 1. (emphasis added)
2. Army After Next FY 19999 Study and Research Plan, version 7.0, dtd 1 Feb 99, pg., 2.
3. Ibid.
4. Berlin, 3.
5. Eugenia C. Kiesling, Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1996) 2.
6. Ibid., 5.
7. Ibid., 180. Dissonance is defined as an inconsistency between the beliefs one holds or as inconsistency between one's actions and one's beliefs. DR. Kiesling used both of the definitions of dissonance in her description of the term "cognitive dissonance." French military and civilian leaders new that the French Army was unprepared for war against Germany, but were able to convince themselves that the Army would be successful. Furthermore, even in light of their belief that the French Army was unprepared, in those areas where they could have improved preparations they did nothing for fear of communicating both to the soldiers in the French Army and to French allies that they were unprepared.
8. Ibid., 188.
9. Harold R. Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1988) 5.
10. Ibid., 23.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 24.
13. Ibid., 25.
14. Ibid., 239.

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 227.
19. Allan R. Millett and Murray Williamson eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 305.
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23. Edward M. Earle, "Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power," in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986) 218.
24. David Jablonsky, "Why is Strategy Difficult?," Professional Readings in Military Strategy, No. Four (1995): 39.
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27. Ibid., 25-26.
28. Ibid., 28.
29. United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Going hollow: the warnings of the Chiefs of Staff: an update", comp. John McCain, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Senator John McCain, 1994) 1.
30. Katherine M. Peters, "A Matter of Trust," Government Executive (January 1999): 25.

31. Ibid., 26.

32. James Kitfield, "The Hollow Force Myth," National Journal (December 1998) 2906-2911.

33. Kitfield, "The Hollow Force Myth," Government Executive (January 1999): 58-59.

34. David McCormick, "The Downsized Warrior," (New York: New York University Press, 1998) 26.

35. M. Thomas Davis, "Managing Defense After the Cold War," (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1997) 30.

36. Kitfield, "The Hollow Force Myth," Government Executive (January 1999), 58.

37. This figure and statement are based on the remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series.

38. Scott Donahue <DonahueS@usfk.korea.army.mil>, "Combat Readiness Statement to Congress," electronic mail message to David W. Washechek <WashechekD@emh5.STEWART.ARMY.MIL>, 9 March 1999.

39. U.S. Army War College, How the Army Runs (Pennsylvania: Carlisle Barracks, 1997-1998), 3-11.

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42. Jablonsky, "The Owl of Minerva Flies at Twilight," 17.

43. Winton, 240.

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